UAB™
UAB is where a builder composes a governed multi-agent system. You describe the roles and the authority each may delegate; UAB validates that against a governed-system contract and provisions a root that already carries its own cryptographic identity, with every child's authority bounded by its parent's.
The outcome
Composing a governed multi-agent system means wiring identity, delegation and least-privilege authority by hand, per agent, and hoping the wiring is right before anything runs.
You compose roles and a permitted-delegation envelope on one surface; UAB validates it against a governed-system contract and provisions a root that already carries its own cryptographic identity, with every child's authority bounded by its parent's.
UAB is the builder's on-ramp to the whole stack, the fastest way to stand up agents that already speak VAID and answer to the SYNTHERA foundation.
How it works
UAB turns a governed system from something you assemble by hand into something you compose and provision. Three steps, one surface.
Compose
Describe the roles in your system and the permitted-delegation envelope between them, who may act on whose behalf, and how far that authority reaches.
Validate
The spec is checked live against a governed-system contract as you build it, so an unsound composition is caught before anything is provisioned, not after it misbehaves.
Provision
UAB hands the validated spec to a provisioning engine, which mints the system's root identity and deploys it carrying the delegation envelope you composed. The rest of the tree is authority the root may pass on, each child minted, and attenuated, at the moment it is spawned.
Proof
The point of a governed surface is that the guardrail is real. What is governed is delegation: which roles may spawn which children, and how far the child's authority may reach. A composition that lets a child escape its parent's scope is refused.
role: planner scope → acme/ role: researcher may be spawned by planner # the composition gives the child a scope its parent does not hold planner → spawn researcher, scope acme-secrets/ ... DENIED reason: child scope is not a subset of the parent's
Refused twice, independently: by the schema in the browser before anything is provisioned, and by the foundation itself when the root tries to mint that child at runtime. The foundation-side denial is proven in the engine's own test harnesses, not from the browser.
SYNTHERA is the trust layer for multi-agent systems: every agent gets a verifiable identity, scoped authority and a tamper-evident record, so software from different teams, vendors and frameworks can act on each other’s behalf without custom glue between every pair.