UAB™
UAB is where a builder composes a governed multi-agent system. You describe the roles and the authority each may delegate; UAB validates that against a governed-system contract and provisions a root that already carries its own cryptographic identity, with every child's authority bounded by its parent's.
The outcome
Composing a governed multi-agent system means wiring identity, delegation and least-privilege authority by hand, per agent, and hoping the wiring is right before anything runs.
You compose roles and a permitted-delegation envelope on one surface; UAB validates it against a governed-system contract and provisions a root that already carries its own cryptographic identity, with every child's authority bounded by its parent's.
UAB is the builder's on-ramp to the whole stack – the fastest way to stand up agents that already speak VAID and answer to the SYNTHERA foundation.
How it works
UAB turns a governed system from something you assemble by hand into something you compose and provision. Three steps, one surface.
Compose
Describe the roles in your system and the permitted-delegation envelope between them – who may act on whose behalf, and how far that authority reaches.
Validate
The spec is checked live against a governed-system contract as you build it, so an unsound composition is caught before anything is provisioned, not after it misbehaves.
Provision
UAB hands the validated spec to a provisioning engine, which mints the system's root identity and deploys it carrying the delegation envelope you composed. The rest of the tree is authority the root may pass on – each child minted, and attenuated, at the moment it is spawned.
Proof
The point of a governed surface is that the guardrail is real. What is governed is delegation: which roles may spawn which children, and how far the child's authority may reach. A composition that lets a child escape its parent's scope is refused.
role: planner scope → acme/ role: researcher may be spawned by planner # the composition gives the child a scope its parent does not hold planner → spawn researcher, scope acme-secrets/ ... DENIED reason: child scope is not a subset of the parent's
Refused twice, independently: by the schema in the browser before anything is provisioned, and by the foundation itself when the root tries to mint that child at runtime. The foundation-side denial is proven in the engine's own test harnesses, not from the browser.
SYNTHERA is the trust layer for multi-agent systems: every agent gets a verifiable identity, scoped authority and a tamper-evident record, so software from different teams, vendors and frameworks can act on each other’s behalf without custom glue between every pair.